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"Splendid, but what does it actually mean?"1 
Good faith and relational contracts in the UK construction industry 
The most important modern report on the culture of the UK construction industry had, as its 
aim, the creation of an atmosphere in the industry where, in the words of Lewis Carroll's 
Dodo: 
 "Everybody has won and all must have prizes"2 
That required "better performance"; "teamwork" and a "healthier atmosphere" for working.3 
While the idea of "good faith" is not mentioned, the attitude contained in those sorts of 
outcomes would seem to underpin it.  Linked to that is the focus on relationships between 
the parties involved.  
In a recent lecture on the topic of good faith in construction by Lord Justice Jackson, he 
remarked: "no self-respecting academic in this area [I.e. good faith and contracts generally] 
can resist the temptation" to write about relational contracts.4  That trend will continue here 
since clearly the ideals set out above have the parties' relationship at their heart The most 
recent case law has not, however, been as relationship focussed.  
A number of recommendations were put forward in the Latham Report and have found their 
way into UK construction law and practice.5 This is reflected in the fact that working 
"collaboratively" is a key idea in modern construction practice.6 The recent collapse of the 
second largest UK contractor, Carillion,7 has exposed – in many ways – the failings in the 
1 With apologies to Lord Justice Jackson this is a conflation of two rhetorical questions he poses on the nature 
and definition of good faith in construction contracts – see headings 4 and 4.3. Lord Justice Jackson, “Does 
good faith have any role in construction contracts” Pinsent Masons Lecture in Hong Kong, November 20176 
available https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/speech-lj-jackson-masons-lecture-hong-
kong.pdf (“Jackson Lecture”) 
2 Sir Michael Latham Constructing the Team: Joint Review of Procurement and Contractual Arrangements in the 
UK Construction Industry HMSO 1994). (See p. v of the Report).  Sir Michael preferred this to the "win win 
solutions" of the management consultant.  
3 ibid 
4 Jackson Lecture para. 4.5 
5 Principally in the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 
6 and in other sectors, increasingly such as the UK Offshore Oil and Gas industry - UKCS Maximising Recovery 
Review: Final Report (February 2014) 
7 Daniel Thomas Where did it go wrong for Carillion? BBC News 15 January 2018 available 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-42666275> 
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business models and approaches to this practice in the UK but that heightens the need to 
develop collaboration in some form, rather than lessen it.  Many of the discussions on this 
issue focus on how to commercially arrange projects in such a way as to align parties' 
interests. For example, the NEC 4 version of the alliancing contract which does this will be 
discussed briefly below. Beyond that, there is now an International Standard for 
Collaboration8 which provides for various processes and procedures. The construction 
industry has been familiar with “partnering” contracts for some time, too. All of these look 
beyond the legal framework to some extent to appeal to parties’ commercial interests. 
Alternatively (or in addition) they set out detailed processes to follow9. This is good, but the 
impact is largely restricted to those projects which justify the extra project management, 
administrative and procurement expense. More broadly, the various levels of thought and 
ideas (whether social, cultural, economic and so on) engaged within the structures of these 
contracts limits the scope to assess the role of the specifically legal obligations within those 
frameworks in promoting collaboration. So, the focus here will be on innovative construction 
contracts that attempt to capture this idea and how that moves the focus towards 
relationships – underpinned by good faith - in their language and structure. The way in which 
this will need the wider culture around construction projects to change will also be discussed. 
One part of the move to make contracts more collaborative is found in a contractual provision 
which is broadly understood as creating an obligation on the parties to perform the contract 
in "good faith".10The way in which this is operated identifies a tension which goes beyond the 
ideal of better working together and moves towards developing different understandings of 
the framework of contract law.  
This is because "good faith" obligations and their treatment in construction law 
simultaneously lie at the heart of and expose a tension in the law. On this analysis, it lies on 
8 ISO 4001: 2017 Collaborative business relationship management systems -- Requirements and framework 
9 The NEC suite also does this to some extent – see David Christie “Capturing Collaboration in Construction 
Contracts” in Heidemann and Lee (eds) The future of Commercial Contracts in Scholarship and Law reform 
(Springer, 2018)) (“Capturing Collaboration”).  
10 This is not to say that the wider solution does not require focus on the other levels of thought and ideas – 
but that the focus here is on the legal aspect.  
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the balance point between the need for cooperation11 and the need for certainty.12 Previous 
examination of this issue has identified the difficulties in filling that gap.13 Since good faith is 
a more general, open textured word – which focuses on aspects of parties conduct and 
(although this is difficult to capture) attitude – this helps to create a route to at least 
transparency and a more collaborative approach to a contract: rather than simply 
enumerating specific and particular requirements.  A workable solution is for the parties to 
acknowledge this tension ahead of the contract being executed and to work together to 
understand their relationship and approaches better.14 That has the benefit of harnessing and 
building the collaborative spirit but only by sidestepping the question of how the 'good faith' 
obligation operates, rather than dealing with it head-on.  
However, this developing picture has been impacted by a more restrictive interpretation 
placed on "construction law" good faith in recent case law and extrajudicial commentary, 
which risks weakening even a drive to that sort of pragmatic solution. Moreover, this 
restrictive treatment demonstrates the difficulty with interpreting express good faith type 
obligations in the UK construction law context. That may well impact on the success of moves 
to get the parties working more collaboratively.  
These recent developments will be discussed, and further consideration given to what the 
next steps for the use of "good faith" obligations in construction contracts might be. Firstly, 
in identifying and objections and secondly in suggesting how to move the discussion forward. 
11 Leggatt J (2016) Contractual duties of good faith. Lecture to the Commercial Bar Association, 18 October 2016 
available at https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/mr-justice-leggatt-lecture-
contractual-duties-of-faith.pdf  
12 Matthew Bell, (2016) Contract theorists: What did they ever do for us in construction law? May 2016, D189 
available on www.scl.org.uk/papers 
13  David Christie "How can the obligation to cooperate in a spirit of mutual trust and cooperation in NEC 3 help 
collaboration" 2017 International Construction Law Review 93 (“Cooperation in NEC3”) 
14 ibid at pp11-113.  
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Good faith in this context refers to the use of the terminology in the performance of contracts 
(rather than in other stages of the contract’s existence) an area where Scots law may 
historically have been at the forefront15 but Canada has recently taken something of a lead.16 
For the purposes of this paper, Scots and English "construction law" will be treated as similar. 
Aside from issues around remedies, the underlying law of obligations is generally sufficiently 
alike to be mutually informative. The main industry players operate on both sides of Hadrian's 
Wall and the key regulations and legislation are UK wide in their effect.17  
"Good faith" in UK construction – where we are. 
There have been a few cases which have discussed good faith in the UK construction industry 
in the last few years. This has grown from two seeds.  
The first of these is the judgment of Leggatt J in Yam Seng18 which sparked a general appetite 
to make arguments based on good faith.  The case has been widely discussed. One point 
arising from it is the linking of good faith with “relational” contracts. There has been 
discussion ‘relational’ contracts in academic literature since the introduction of the concept 
by McNeill in the 1960s and onwards.19 Over that period, there has been a development of 
the understanding of what it means but the heart of the idea is that a contract ought to be 
understood and interpreted best in the context of its place within a relationship between two 
15 The case of Mackay v Dick (1881) 6 App Cas 25 is a commonly cited case as the source of the obligation to 
cooperate see e.g. at p. 16 to Sir Vivian Ramsay and Stephen Furst QC Keating on Construction Contracts Sweet 
and Maxwell (10th Ed, 2017) 
16 In Bhasin v Hrynew- 2014 SCC 71. The discussion in David Percy, The emergence of good faith as a principle 
of contract performance in Simone Degeling, James Edelman, James Goudkamp (eds) Contract in commercial 
law (2016) is particularly helpful  
17 for example, the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 (as amended) or the Construction 
Design and Management Regulations 2015 to name but two. The general overlap in terms of commercial law 
and the influence of the House of Lords Judicial Committee and latterly the UK Supreme Court are clearly 
important. 
18 2013 EWHC 111(QB); 2013 All ER (Comm) 1321, [2013] EWHC 111 (QB) 
19 See e.g. Iain R MacNeill The New Social Contract (Yale UP: New Haven, Conn, 1980); Iain R MacNeill, I.R 
Contracts: adjustment of long-term economic relations under classical, neo-classical and relational contract law 
(1997) 72 Northwestern University Law Review 854Iain R MacNeill, I.R Relational contract theory: challenges 
and queries. (2000) 94Northwestern University Law Review 877 and critique from Randy Barnett Conflicting 
visions: a critique of Ian MacNeill’s relational theory of contract. (1992) Virginia Law Review 78. A recent 
discussion – with further references is in David Campbell Good faith and the ubiquity of the relational contract. 
(2014) MLR 460 
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parties. One of the impacts of the decision in Yam Seng was to bring a more “blackletter” 
definition to the contract, when Leggatt J said:  
"Such“ relational” contracts, as they are sometimes called, may require a high degree 
of communication, cooperation and predictable performance based on mutual trust 
and confidence and involve expectations of loyalty which are not legislated for in the 
express terms of the contract but are implicit in the parties' understanding and 
necessary to give business efficacy to the arrangements. Examples of such relational 
contracts might include some joint venture agreements, franchise agreements and 
long-term distributorship agreements."20 
This case sits within a growing development of the idea of good faith and its meaning growing 
from issues of intention and honesty21 and more widely. As Jackson LJ notes, many academics 
have felt the urge to explore the topic. Notably, Campbell has made clear links with good faith 
terms of its linkage with the idea of the relational contract22 and Saintier has attempted to 
explain the concept as used in French (Civil) Law, as a means of demystifying it.23 In the 
construction law context, the present author has undertaken some analysis of the context of 
good faith, more broadly and Mante has attempted to interpret the particular words.24 Others 
have also explored the concept in this commercial context. The growing international 
importance of the topic can be seen in the wider selection of papers in this journal.  
After the case law developments, the second development in the growth of “good faith” in 
construction is  that the suite of standard form contracts known initially as the "New 
Engineering Contract" and now as the "NEC" has been coming to particular prominence in the 
UK25 following its use for the delivery of such significant projects as the London 2012 Olympics 
and London Crossrail – as well as increasing popularity more generally. The NEC suite of 
contracts, which has been around in various editions for 20 years, has a specific goal of being 
20 Ibid at para. 142 and also David Campbell David Campbell Good faith and the ubiquity of the relational 
contract. (2014) MLR 460 
21 J. Steyn Contract Law: fulfilling the reasonable expectations of honest men (1997) LQR 433 and Tan Keeping 
faith with good faith? The evolving trajectory post Yam Seng and Bhasin (2016) JBL 420  
22 See Campbell n. 18  
23 Severine Saintier The elusive notion of good faith in the performance of a contract, why still a bête noir for 
civil and the common law (2017) JBL 441 
24 Joseph Mante Mutual Trust and Cooperation under NEC 3 & 4: A fresh perspective (2018) Const LJ 231 
25 although the usage - which had been growing “year or year” seems to have dropped back or at least 
plateaued see NBS National Construction Contracts and Law Report 2018.   
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"collaborative"26 (and an earlier version of the contract was endorsed by Latham as helping 
towards that sort of goal).27 There are various ways in which this is done28 but for present 
purposes, the key is the provision set out at the start of the contract that the parties will 
comply with their obligations and "work together in a spirit of mutual trust and 
cooperation."29  This obligation has been understood as bringing in similar obligations to good 
faith.30  
This phrase (“mutual trust and cooperation”) was found in the earlier versions of the contract 
and in the NEC 2 (which overall form was endorsed by Latham as being collaborative) and has 
broadly survived into the fourth edition: NEC 4, which was issued in summer 2017. That new 
version has split the provision into two: (i) to comply with the contract and (ii) to cooperate 
in a spirt of mutual trust and cooperation into two sub clauses It has been suggested31 that 
the split serves to emphasise the first provision: compliance with the contract. That may be 
so – but another reading is to demonstrate that, by physically placing the obligations side by 
side on the page, the provisions are given more equal standing. Mante has looked at the 
interpretation of the particular words. 32 
The new version of the NEC contract has also included a specific form based on “Alliancing” – 
a more advanced form of collaboration which aligns parties commercial and wider interests, 
not just their legal ones. It creates a platform for engagement and risk sharing across the 
construction project team: not just the more traditional pairing in a construction project (with 
a project manager as referee). In the alliancing contract, each project has its own set of project 
governance routines.33 Such a platform ought to be given a chance to succeed but the 
contractual framework is complex and is likely to require significant investments in effort and 
funds to operate smoothly. Moreover, the apportionment of risk and profit sharing means 
26 Dr Martin Barnes, Preface Engineering and Construction Contract, NEC 3 April 2013) 
27 Latham Report, para. 5.19 at p. 39. 
28 see Capturing Collaboration n. 8.  (“Capturing Collaboration”) 
29 Clause 10.1 of the New Engineering Contract 3rd Edition  
30See e.g. discussion by Shy Jackson “Good faith revisited” (2014) Const LJ 379 at p.379 and referring, in 
particular to the clause in the case of Compass Group UK and Ireland Limited (t/a Medirest) v Mid Essex 
Hospital Services NHS trust 2013 EWCA Civ 200 and the lecture given by Lord Justice Jackson which is discussed 
below.  
31 By the anonymous reviewer of this piece (for which thanks) 
32 See discussion by Joseph Mante Mutual Trust and Cooperation under NEC 3 & 4: A fresh perspective (2018) 
Const LJ 231  
33 See discussion by, among others, Khalid Ramzan NEC4 Alliance Contract opens door to increased collaboration 
“available at:  https://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2018/june/nec4-alliance-contract-increased-collaboration/
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that the parties’ interests are aligned through different processes and cultural and 
psychological drivers. The present exercise is focussed on the extent to which parties retain 
their own underlying commercial interests and aims at examining more straightforward 
contractual arrangements. That then requires examination of particular parts of the contract. 
In the construction context, the case law judgments have avoided giving an expansive 
definition to these "good faith" type obligations and generally seem to have endeavoured to 
avoid dealing with the substance of the term34  although there are examples where it35 (or 
similar ideas)36 have influenced the interpretation of the provisions. If not directly opposed 
to it, this does seem to run against what seems to be the broader trend within case law on 
the interpretation of contracts which has lately focussed on the words of the contractual 
document.37 
This avoidance of engaging with the scope and extent of good faith is frustrating in many ways 
since the wording is expressly written into the contract and has survived the updating of the 
contract through several editions. The courts appear to be trying to grapple with the concept 
but without doing enough to take on the novelty and innovation of the wording in place. The 
courts ought to do more to give effect to the wording.38 
Understanding and developing the context for "good faith" 
 A lot of construction law discussion and analysis is practice-focussed and blackletter without 
a great deal of doctrinal inquiry.39 As noted above, while there has been some discussion of 
34  See discussion in Cooperation in NEC n. 11 at pp. 99 - 100  
35 See Northern Ireland Housing Executive v Healthy Buildings (Ireland) Limited [2017] NIQB 43 (discussed 
below) (thanks again to the anonymous reviewer for the tip off).   
36 Birse Construction Ltd v St David Ltd [1999] EWHC253 (TCC) used a “partnering charter” – see discussion in 
Cooperation in NEC 3 (n.11) at pp.110 to 111.  
37 Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36. and Lord Sumption A Question of Taste: The Supreme Court and the 
Interpretation of Contracts, Harris Society Annual Lecture, Keble College, Oxford, 8 May 2017, available at: 
https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-170508.pdf cf. Lord Hoffmann Language and Lawyers. (2018) 134 
Law Quarterly Review (Oct) 553. Its an interesting question of the extent to which the contract is bringing in 
external reference points, expressly and how that fits. 
38 Although not in favour of specifically introducing good faith, Steyn Contract Law: fulfilling the reasonable 
expectations of honest men (1997) LQR 433 and case law through to Emirates Trading Agency LLC v Prime 
Mineral Exports Pte Ltd [2015] 1WLR 1145; [2014] EWHC 2104 (Comm) 
39 The leading textbooks for example are both produced by barrister's sets - namely Keating Chambers and 
Atkin Chambers, with some honourable exceptions see Bell n. [4] supra and Nicolas Baatz Factual and Legal 
causation – a thorny subject A paper based on talks given in London on 6th October 2015, Bristol on 15th 
October 2015 and Manchester on 22nd February 2016, Society of Construction Law Paper No. 202 available < 
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good faith in that context, the nature of the study and practice of construction law has made 
it difficult to transfer the more theoretical work across.  This can make it harder to deal with 
new and more abstract concepts. Without more philosophical thinking to underpin how the 
wording is to be interpreted in the construction context, it means that, rather than helping 
the parties to collaborate, it potentially is fuel for disputes over the interpretation of 
obligations - based on weak arguments. While the words seem aimed at providing flexibility 
– there is insufficient clarity over their meaning to allow them to be used effectively. The
controversy of the case law discussions on good faith are testament to that. The balance
between clarity and flexibility is not struck here, yet.
It is worth considering the wider trend of academic writing to consider how to achieve that 
balance. So, for example, it is helpful to look at the work of Wightman as a guide. On his 
analysis, the usual meaning of good faith needs to be derived from an external source or set 
of values. There are two principal sources for this meaning: whether it is “normative” (some 
general value system – which is hard to identify in the modern world)40 or “contextual” 
(reference to a more specific industry related meaning). 41 This reference to the context can 
be seen in the case law, for example in Compass Group UK and Ireland Limited (t/a Medirest) v Mid 
Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust42  – even where a more substantive meaning of good faith 
was not really developed. Taking account of that basis, in the context, there are several 
possible ways in which the obligation could be developed.  
Firstly, one possible result of this analysis is to treat good faith as a guide to contractual 
interpretation: essentially encouraging the courts to take account of commercial common 
sense (an external value) or something else which draws on the practice in that industry.   
The difficulty with that is that if the parties were seeking that result then it might be expected 
that they make that purpose clear (for example, the parties agree that this contract ought to 
https://www.scl.org.uk/papers/%E2%80%98factual%E2%80%99-%E2%80%98legal%E2%80%99-causation-
construction-infrastructure-law-thorny-subject>  
40 John Wightman “Good faith and pluralism in the Law of Contract” in Brownsword, Hird and Howells Good 
Faith in Contract: Concept and Context at pp42 – 44. Discussed in Cooperation in NEC 3 at pp. 103 -107 
41 Ibid at pp44- 46 (and discussed in Cooperation in NEC 3 at 107 – 109) 
42 2013 EWCA Civ 200 especially “It is clear from the authorities that the content of a duty of good faith is 
heavily conditioned by its context” at para. 109 
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be interpreted in the context of its "surrounding circumstances"43). The extent to which this 
attempt might be successful is therefore unknown but at least the parties the argument 
would be based on explicit guidance given by the parties, to the courts as to their intentions. 
There is further difficulty in that the emphasis on the use of the wider context of the contract 
over a more formalist/literal interpretation has shifted considerably over the last decade or 
so, in the UK: so it is difficult to now assess what was being contracted out of.44 Having said 
that, and notwithstanding the change of the structure of the clause, noted above, the wording 
has survived in the NEC suite of contracts despite the swing of the pendulum from contextual 
to formalist emphases in interpretation without being changed - which suggests that the 
panel of experts who draft the contract (to look at the context of the drafting) did not consider 
that they needed to change the wording to reflect that swing. Moreover, it would seem 
anomalous that the clause which seems – if anything – to be focussed on dispute avoidance 
and the parties’ relationships to each other became seen as a call to action for a dispute 
resolver – whether a judge or arbitrator. Finally, and importantly, there are questions over 
the nature of the context against which the express good faith obligation is to be assessed: if 
the aim is collaborative working, it is doubtful that the standards against which to judge 
behaviour are sufficiently certain to create an appropriate benchmark for assessment. One 
point in the NEC’s suite favour in this regard is that when read as a whole, its aims and 
philosophy are quite clear and so there is potential for that set of contracts, at least, to be 
considered a wider context. 45 That said, this context was not made a factor in recent decisions 
a as set out below.46 
Secondly, in the absence of a clear meaning, it may simply be that the obligation is to act as a 
“rhetorical reminder”47 or “mood music”48 to try and create a cultural influence on the 
43 see e.g. Luminar Lava Ignite v Mama Group PLC [2010] CSIH 01 This is the Scottish equivalent to "factual 
matrix" arguments (see e.g. Prenn v Simmonds [1971] 1 WLR 1381; Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West 
Bromwich Building Society; [1998] 1 WLR 896 and Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] 1 AC 1101 etc.). Luminar 
is referenced here to provide an opportunity to reference the author's favourite case which looked at the 
interpretation of non-compete clauses between two nightclubs in Edinburgh: leading to a more in-depth 
discussion of various forms of musical style than had previously been heard in open court  
44 The more formalist approach endorsed in Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36 would militate against this more 
expansive interpretation.  
45 See Cooperation in NEC 3 for expanded versions of these arguments.  
46 Although it has perhaps been influential in e.g. NIHE v Healthy Buildings [2017] NIQB 43 (see below). 
47 see Cooperation in NEC 3 at p.101  
48 Ibid and as termed by Mike Barlow, see David Mosey Love and Understanding Building, Tuesday 15 
November 2016 www.building.co.uk/nec-contracts-love-and-understanding 
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project:  that is, to remind parties to check their emotions in interpreting other parties' actions 
by reference to a value based on their relationship. 49 The argument against this is that if the 
parties sought a cultural lever there are other mechanisms to use than to add an ambiguous 
term to their contract.50 
That said, in Northern Ireland Housing Executive v Healthy Buildings (Ireland) Limited51, the 
court was asked to consider whether the meaning of the word “forecast” in terms of costs 
claimable under Clause 60 of one of the NEC 3 contracts ought to mean that – if the actual 
figures were available – the actual figures would be used. The court in that case considered 
that an interpretation that they would not be, would be “antipathetic”52 to the idea of mutual 
trust in the contract (although the decision was reached without more direct reference to 
that mutual trust provision). That contains both of the ideas noted above – since the “mood 
music” suggests ‘playing fair’ and the overall aim of the NEC contract focusses on ideas of 
proactivity and engagement which make it clear that “forecast” ought to reflect the best 
information available. The issues which arise are not resolved by this decision – which it is 
submitted did not particularly engage good faith and, importantly in terms of what follows, 
there was no real discussion of the “good faith” phrasing on the decision reached.  
As a result, it is difficult to see a wholly satisfactory definition of the term used in the NEC and 
the most pragmatic solution was to throw the situation back on the parties to work out for 
themselves what they intended – but at the outset of a project rather than when relationships 
break down.53 That would help the goal of collaborative working but would not advance much 
towards understanding the parameters of the good faith obligations in construction contracts 
– and help develop an understanding which might be used more widely.
Driving all these interpretations is, it seems, a desire to get the parties to be flexible, 
collaborate or cooperate in some way (indeed that specific desire is in the clause). The 
difficulty is in terms of identifying the parameters of that collaboration. That difficulty is 
49 Ibid.  
50 Ibid at p.102 
51 [2017] NIQB 43 
52 Ibid at [43] 
53 Cooperation in NEC 3 (n.11) at p111 - 112 
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highlighted in the most recent interventions by recognised specialist construction law judges, 
in England.  
Recent developments in the understanding of good faith in construction law 
There have been two recent discussions on good faith by leading construction specialist 
judges – Sir Rupert Jackson, on the cusp of retirement from the English Court of Appeal and 
Sir Peter Coulson, about to step up to the Appeal Court.  These discussions can be seen in the 
context of the growing work on good faith – such as that noted above – both in the UK and 
internationally (such as in the Bhasin decision in Canada). Indeed, Jackson’s lecture seems to 
be an attempt to put construction law in that wider context.  
These two interventions suggest that there is a hardening up of the judicial view –against 
giving much "content" to the performance obligation of good faith. The tension – and the 
concern – to which this gives rise is that it runs against the thrust of an idea which the parties 
have agreed to include in their contract. The general tenor of recent case law from the UK 
Supreme Court on the interpretation of contracts is to look at the words the parties have 
used.54 There is a tension between this generally formal approach, which focusses on the 
words of the contract, and the attempts to read those words narrowly. Of course, that does 
leave the challenge of how to interpret those words and so the views of the senior judges are 
important. It is, however, notable that Sir George Leggatt, the principal proponent of “good 
faith” within the senior English judiciary55 has joined Sir Peter Coulson in the Court of Appeal. 
It may be that an appropriate case can be found to test their respective views.  
At the heart of the discussion of good faith in the construction context is probably the most 
definitive discussion of the "mutual trust" clause in the NEC 3, thus far in case law, in Costain 
v Tarmac.56 This case arose following the supply of defective concrete for motorway barriers. 
The contract for this work contained a few incorporated documents – including two dispute 
resolution procedures. The bulk of the judgement is given over to the job of interpreting these 
54 See cases and other interventions noted at n. 53 and Lord Pannick QC Up for interpretation: when judges 
disagree about which word is law The Times of London, 26 October 2018 
55 See Yam Seng above at n. 16, the lecture at n. 9 and most recently Sir George Leggatt Negotiation in Good 
Faith: Adapting to Changing Circumstances in Contracts and English Contract Law Jill Poole Memorial Lecture, 
Aston University: 19 October 2018 
56 [2017] EWHC 319 (TCC)  
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procedures to ascertain if an arbitration agreement was operative, on the facts of the case. A 
further point arose when it was suggested that the defendants in the case ought to have been 
clearer with the claimants about the interpretation of the dispute resolution procedures.  The 
argument in that respect was that failure to do so breached the obligation of mutual trust and 
cooperation. On that point, the judge said:  
“I am…prepared to accept that this obligation would go further than the negative 
obligation…it would extend to a positive obligation on the part of the defendant to 
correct a false assumption obviously being made by the claimant… 
But beyond that, on any view of clause 10.1, there can have been no further obligation 
because otherwise the provision would have required the defendant to put aside his 
own self-interest”57 
The focus on allowing parties to maintain their own self-interest is particularly noteworthy 
here – and is in line with the general arguments of legal policy used against developing good 
faith in English law – that "parties are free to pursue their own self-interest not only in 
negotiating but also in performing contracts provided they do not act in breach of a term of 
the contract"58  
It is suggested that this argument also informs the narrow interpretation placed on good faith 
in cases such as Medirest59 - as a means of trying to avoid impinging on what the parties have 
agreed.60 While the narrow approach seems appropriate in this instance, the decision has the 
unfortunate effect of limiting the scope for good faith to be understood. The reasons for why 
this is a missed opportunity will be explained below.  
The discussion in Costain is given further emphasis by the analysis and gloss put upon it as 
part of Jackson LJ’s discussion in his recent lecture. .61 Coulson and Jackson are the most 
senior construction law “practitioners” to have opined on this subject, their views have 
particular weight. In his lecture, Jackson LJ surveyed the overall position on good faith in 
57Ibid at para 124 
58 McKendrick, Contract Law (9th Ed) pp.221–2 cited in Yam Seng (n.16) at para [123] 
59 See n. [28] 
60 Mid Essex v Compass – and also in terms of relational contracts more broadly, avoiding the over "stretching 
of consent" see Iain R MacNeill Contracts: adjustment of long-term economic relations under classical, neo-
classical and relational contract law (1977) Northwestern University Law Review 854 
61 Jackson Lecture, n.1  
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construction and more broadly across jurisdictions, that survey covers the Costain case 
among the other key cases.  
Jackson LJ is careful not to give a particularly clear answer on the result or analysis in Costain 
as he is mindful that it might come before him on appeal (which does not seem to have 
occurred) but on that case, Jackson LJ does say: "what is significant about that case is the judges 
valiant struggle to ascribe to clause 10.1 a meaning which was additional to the existing obligations"62 
This restrictive view of the clause is in keeping with his judgement in Medirest and the general 
tenor of the law to date but for reasons explained below, ought not to be the definitive view 
on good faith.  
Aside from this discussion of Costain, Jackson LJ's lecture canvasses the broader horizon of 
good faith in construction including Bhasin63 and the position in China.64  
Having set out the issues initially, Jackson LJ asks, "What does good faith in the common law 
context actually mean?"65 (followed shortly afterwards with a "Splendid, but does any of that 
hold water?)"66 
His answer to these questions is less sure. He does not seem to find any additional meaning 
beyond the other contractual obligations.67 On the use of an express term of good faith he 
says: 
"A 'good faith' obligation in a construction contract may encourage an arbitrator or 
judge called upon to construe the contract to be 'bold': in other words to be slightly 
more willing to give effect to the obvious purpose underlying the contract...It is 
doubtful that an obligation of good faith adds to the obligation of a certifier beyond 
what is already spelt out in the general law."68 
62 Ibid at para. 6.7 
63 [2001] SCC 41 C 
64 Jackson Lecture part 5 (paras 5.1 - 54.). 
65 Jackson Lecture at point 4.  
66Ibid at point 4.3 
67 Ibid para. 4.5 
68 Ibid at para. 6.10 
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He notes that this slightly grudging 'boldness' would even then still be constrained by the 
terms of Arnold v Britton.69That seems a fairly cautious boldness.   
As a result, good faith is further hampered by the more restrictive interpretation of contracts 
now encouraged by the Arnold decision.70 A more contextual interpretation might allow a 
wider frame of reference in examining parties’ conduct.  
The discussion of good faith here, then, concludes with Jackson and Coulson LJJ giving the 
impression of seeking meaning for good faith but without really going far in that search. That 
denies parties an interpretation of their contract which fits with what they have agreed – as 
evidenced by the words they have agreed upon. That may be because in the cases which have 
arisen so far, there has not been a use to be found for the “good faith” language. However, 
the current approach is unsatisfactory for three broad reasons. Firstly, much (but not all) of 
the discussion which tends to cut against good faith focusses on implied obligations. Here 
there is an express obligation and more ought to be done to try and give that meaning. 
Secondly, it gives the impression that the senior judiciary will give weight to the obligations 
of good faith (they seem to be engaged in a “valiant struggle” to do so71) but does not provide 
much by way of guidance about when and how they might do so. This creates uncertainty as 
it leaves parties with the avenue of a good faith argument open. Thirdly, by not recognising 
more by way of an obligation of good faith, the judiciary are following the self-interested 
cultural approach which policy thinkers from Latham onwards have sought to move beyond.  
 In terms of making progress however Jackson LJ was given some opportunity to expand on 
how this approach might operate in practice when giving the judgment in the Court of Appeal 
in the case of Amey v Birmingham City Council.72 That judgment focussed on the obligations 
arising under a "relational" contract rather than a good faith obligation but these are closely 
linked 73and, in any event, the approach of 'boldness' can be seen where Jackson LJ said the 
following:  
"Any relational contract of this character is likely to be of massive length, containing 
many infelicities and oddities. Both parties should adopt a reasonable approach in 
69 [2015] UKSC 36 
70 Which decision was issued following completion of the work on the previous article on this subject 
71 See n.58 
72 Amey Birmingham Highways Ltd v Birmingham City Council [2018] EWCA 264 
73 see the Yam Seng quote at n. 18in which the relational contract was the starting point in the implication of a 
good faith obligation  
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accordance with what is obviously the long - term purpose of the contract. They should 
not be latching onto the infelicities and oddities, in order to disrupt the project and 
maximise their own gain.  
In the present case the PFI contract worked perfectly satisfactorily for the first three 
and a half years. Things only went wrong in 2014 when ABHL thought up an ingenious 
new interpretation of the contract, which would have the effect of reducing their 
workload, alternatively increasing their profit if BCC issued change notices. "74 
The similarities between "boldness" (in the lecture) and "not latching onto infelicities" (in the 
case) are clear: both contain the same sort of idea of being focussed on the main issues and 
avoiding technicalities – generally something like a ‘purposive’ rather than ‘literal’ approach 
(although the fact that neither point is expressed using these terms of art, suggests a more 
rough and ready approach is to be adopted). Moreover, there is a clear link in the literature 
and case law between the use of good faith ideas and those of the relational contract – 
whether it is in Yam Seng, discussions such as Campbell’s75 or in Jackson’s lecture itself.76  
Finally, in the lecture, Jackson LJ cited the same article on relational contracts as he referred 
to in his lecture;77  namely that by Professor Collins (which is discussed below) and said  
"But I question whether there is any need to super-add an obligation of good faith. The 
general law implies a duty to co-operate.78  It is difficult to see what additional conduct 
an obligation of good faith will import, beyond those obligations arising under the 
express or implied terms."79 
Thus, Jackson sees a distinction between relational contracts and good faith. However, this 
fails to give weight to the fact that the "good faith" obligation is also an express term of the 
contract: when Jackson LJ says that there is a struggle to add additional meaning to existing 
obligations, he does not seem to take account that the "mutual trust and cooperation" 
provision is expressed as an existing obligation in the contract and that this is being denuded 
of content.  As noted above, this runs against the general trend in contractual interpretation 
(at least to some extent).  In terms of the position on cooperation – the provision goes beyond 
that with the “mutual trust” language. The express agreement of a more substantive term, it 
74 ibid at paras. 93 and 94 
75 See n. 18   
76 Jackson Lecture, n.1 
77 Jackson Lecture at para. 4.5 
78 referring to MacKay v Dick see n. [ 15  ]. 
79 Jackson Lecture at para. 4.5 
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is suggested, indicates that the parties are seeking to beyond the limits of the underlying idea 
of “cooperation” from the common law – or are at least seeking for it be used differently.  
Taking this observation with the others, set out above, there are four broader comments 
which can be made about it and which underpin the analysis of the next steps.    
1. The Amey obiter help clarify the "bold" approach and it does reflect an approach of
robustly reminding the parties that they have contracted in terms to be positive in
their relationship with each other. That chimes with the approach to enforcing, for
example, statutory adjudication decisions under the Housing Grants, Construction and
Regeneration Act 1996 where the courts have been clear that they will be robust in
allowing enforcement and not look for technical reasons to overturn a decision.80
However, the interaction of this with general contractual interpretation is not clear -
nor is the issue of "boldness" clearly defined. It is possible that it will be identifiable
when it arises but that does not necessarily help the parties to manage their
behaviour.  That leaves matters with a restrictive and minimalist interpretation of
good faith. It only creates uncertainty, without the particular benefit of flexibility. As
flagged in the discussion of good faith above, it would be odd that a mutual obligation
between the parties amounts, in effect, to an instruction for the judge or arbitrator
who is deciding any dispute.
2. At the same time, this broader, generous approach (however limited) highlights the
inconsistency with the rationale based on "self-interest" which is expressed by
Coulson. In the Amey case, the interpretation of the terms arrived at did not require a
"good faith" obligation to assist it.  Indeed, Coulson's logic is itself internally
inconsistent: Coulson J was willing to acknowledge that parties should correct a false
assumption but without addressing the point that that would require the putting aside
of their own self-interest – which he says there cannot be in clause 10.1. The "interest
of the project" mentioned in Amey clearly has some role to play.
80 See e.g. Jackson J (as was) in Carillion v Devonport Dockyard [2005] EWHC 778 (TCC) at para 80 (approved 
Court of Appeal: [2005] EWCA Civ 1358): "Judges must be astute to examine technical defences with a degree 
of scepticism consonant with the policy of the 1996 Act. Errors of law, fact or procedure by an adjudicator 
must be examined critically before the Court accepts that such errors constitute excess of jurisdiction or 
serious breaches of the rules of natural justice”  
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3. The basis for this seems to be a narrow a view of 'self-interest' and lack of emphasis
on the relational aspect of the contract: As Jackson remarks in Amey, one possible
interpretation of this clause is that it requires parties to at least modulate their self-
interest – recognising that there is scope for parties to have a mutual self-interest in
the delivery of the project and crucially, taking account of the relational nature of the
construction contract.
4. The similarity in outcome from a use of "good faith" and the existence of a relational
contract links the two concepts – but as Jackson points out in his lecture – they are
not necessarily reliant on each other.
The answer to this, of course, might be that there is good reason not to take an expansive 
approach to “good faith” in the construction context. The reasons given above demonstrate 
that a more expansive definition is desirable since they would give effect to the express words 
of the contract, and at the same time could contribute to a change in culture by moving 
beyond a (wrongly) narrow view of self-interest.  
Why restrict good faith? 
It is important to try and identify the rationale for why the interpretation of good faith ought 
to be restricted.  
There is the argument for certainty and not bringing in confusion by the introduction of terms 
with no fixed meaning. This has some force and while the broader point about the need to 
ensure that contracts are flexible to meet the needs of those who agreed upon them (while 
avoiding ‘stretching’ beyond the initial consent) 81 ,certainty is an important value.  
The risks of this can be seen from Jackson LJ's reasoning on why such obligations should not 
be implied, when he concludes with  
81 see Iain R MacNeill Contracts: adjustment of long term economic relations under classical, neo-classical and 
relational contract law (1978) 72 Northwestern University Law Review 854 at p. 901. Cf RE Barnet Conflicting 
visions: a critique of Ian MacNeill’s relational theory of contract. (1992) Virginia Law Review:1175 
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"There is generally no reason to imply such a nebulous provision of little utility. There 
is also a wider policy consideration. A large number of individuals who had nothing to 
do with drawing up the contract, have to operate in accordance with its 
provisions...They all need to know what the contract requires and what the contract 
permits. To that end, they do not speculate about ethics or metaphysics. Nor do they 
ring up their lawyers at every turn. They look at the black letter provisions of the 
contract. That is what the court should do as well."82 
This situates one point of the resistance to good faith in UK construction law, namely the 
aspect of the balancing between flexibility and certainty the need for clarity and 
understandability. This need is perhaps more pronounced in the construction law context 
than in other commercial spheres because of the relative disconnect between what the 
commercial/legal teams agree for the terms of the contract and what those delivering the 
works understand to be the situation. This has been identified by the construction law 
commentator, Tony Bingham, as one of the sources for the prevalent disputes in construction 
"Do you see how all these points [I.e. causes of disputes] overlap? The contractual 
rules are unfathomable to the lads83 doing the actual building work"84 
There is the danger that if the discussion on the nature and scope of obligations becomes too 
esoteric it becomes irrelevant to the general project management process – the fundamental 
obligation underpinning delivery. As noted above, one solution is the suggestion of getting 
the teams together to help them work through and develop their understanding.85 
However, against this argument, construction contracts contain plenty of technical provisions 
and the key ought to be that the contract makes sense in operation – whatever the provisions 
say.  
Many children's first impression of the construction industry will have come from the TV show 
"Bob the Builder"86. In that programme, Bob's rallying cry to his team of anthropomorphic 
                                                          
82 Jackson Lecture at para. 6.11 
83 research suggests that this is an accurate assertion 
84 Tony Bingham Still Beating the Drum Building Magazine, 21 April 2017 
85 Cooperation in NEC 3 at pp110 - 113 
86 Created by Keith Chapman in 1998 and recently revived in 2015 following a previous run of 15 years or so. It 
has screened in many countries. The Wikipedia page covers this: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bob_the_Builder  
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construction plant and machinery was "Can we fix it? Yes, we can"87 - the use of the first 
person plural in this clearly indicating that both the problem and the resolution were to be 
shared. It seems unlikely that real life contractors can understand some of the more technical 
provisions of a contract while the core message of the leading construction orientated 
children's programme is deemed to be unfathomable.  
That said, the need to keep things simple is important to bear in mind. One of the strongest 
points made by the NEC suite is that it uses plain English – which promotes this.88 That does 
not mean that we ought not to engage with complicated ideas to try and identify the way 
forward. It does mean that the need for the operation of the construction contract to "make 
sense" is an important factor to be considered.  
To get to this resolution, however, it is necessary to understand how the more restrictive 
analysis of good faith seems to underplay (I) the relational nature of the contract (specifically 
the NEC) and linked to that (ii) the nature of self interest in construction projects and more 
broadly. The restrictive view does not necessarily reflect the desire of parties to deliver 
successfully and, moreover, to the extent that it might, the arguments around changing 
culture suggest that this attitude ought to be developed. Overcoming these hurdles is 
important in developing the collaborative spirit, as well as resolving the issue of what the 
words in an important standard form say.  
Relational Context 
The linking of good faith and the relational contract is clear from the literature and the case 
law is clear (as has been seen).  The terms are not, however, synonymous. The Yam Seng 
approach was that relational contracts might give rise to implied good faith. The question 
might be asked about whether express good faith provisions give rise to relational contracts, 
and what the impact of that might be.  
As Jackson notes in Amey and as is clear from the literature, there is considerable debate on 
the meaning of relational contracts.89 There is an understanding in the case law about what 
                                                          
87 "Can we fix it?" Theme to Bob the Builder by Paul K Joyce, 2000 
88  see discussion of language by Peter Rosher NEC3 contracts: partnering benefits, drawbacks and adaptation under French 
law 2015 IBLJ 311 at pp. 316 -317 
89 see sources cited a n.19 above.   
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sort of features are required. 90 That may come from the discussion by Leggatt noted above, 
or from comments such as Lady Wolffe's in Unicorn Tower v HSBC Plc 91, Lady Wolffe said 
gave the example of a relational contract as one "where the nature and duration of the 
contract pointed to a need for active co-operation between the parties"92. The link between 
cooperation and relationality is therefore clear from the case law. It would fit the model of 
trying to build a more collaborative approach to delivery of construction projects. However, 
the cases on the subject tend not to include construction contracts as particular examples 
within the definition: suggesting that the link is not immediately apparent (although that 
might also reflect the nature of the disputes and the broad terms of reference). To some 
extent, that might be understandable. If (and this analysis is disputed) there is a continuum 
of contracts between simple, one-off transactions (such as the purchase of basic groceries) 
and relational contracts (such as ongoing commercial agency arrangements),93 then 
construction contracts can be seen to have features drawn from both ends of the spectrum.  
Moreover, even within construction contracts there are differences of approach. On the one 
hand, the relatively simply constructed contract forms promulgated by the Joint Contracts 
Tribunal (“JCT”) and which remain the most popular within the UK, take a relatively restricted 
and narrow approach to the parties’ relationship. By contrast, the NEC suite which is the focus 
of the discussion seems to put more store on relational issues such as communication and 
information94 – with a key focus on collaboration, as noted above. At the more ‘relational’ 
end of the spectrum, still, are expressly relationship contracts which focus on “Partnering” 
and “Alliancing”. These focus on aligning the parties’ interests and detailed provisions for 
relationship managing.  
So, it is true that the relationship between the parties to the construction contract lasts for a 
period and has to deal with changing circumstances and needs for flexibility. Indeed, the 
specific need for striking the balance between security and flexibility is recognised in for 
example, the Draft Common Frame of Reference which gives construction services contracts 
                                                          
90 The summary by Angharad Parry in Contract and Good Faith: An idea gaining ground? At 
<https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f306fb14-fe65-4a41-a32b-d6fa1dcdd52e> is a good, brief 
and interesting summary of the current situation 
91 2018 CSOH 30 
92 para. 43 and echoing the English court of Appeal in TRW v Globe Motors [2016] EWCA Civ 396 at para. 65 
93 see e.g. MacNeill n. [ 90] above. 
94 Arthur McInnis The New Engineering Contract: relational contracting, good faith and cooperation. [2003] 
ICLR 128 at 130 
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as a specific example of a contract where security comes from flexibility (rather than from 
having a more certain set of obligations, which would usually be the case).95 At the same time, 
the parties' relationship itself is not always particularly long – perhaps a question of months 
(though this is not always the case, reflecting that the rules are not fixed in stone).  Against 
this, the case law suggests that relational contracts are relationships that span a longer period 
– reaching often into years: which suggests a different character of arrangements from the 
more “medium term” construction contract.  
The outcome or output of a construction contract is usually a fixed "thing" which might be 
philosophically tied to a sale of goods contract: a one-off transaction - rather than being open-
ended provision of a service such as exists in many of the cases.96 Finally, the very level of 
detail which is spelt out in many construction contracts could mean that the relationship is 
deemed codified to the exclusion of other values. (That seems to reflect the restrictive 
interpretation – but excludes the scope for further development or a broader more flexible 
approach) Finally, the fact that parties can choose a higher or lower level of “integration” in 
the delivery of a project suggests that not all construction contracts ought to be treated as 
being as relational as each other.   
It, therefore, could be said that construction contracts may not be relational contracts – at 
least as a general or universal rule. The question is open – but as possible new interpretations 
emerge, that risks causing uncertainty.  Further investigation, beyond the case law is 
therefore required.  
Calling back to the academic work, Jackson LJ in both his lecture and the Amey judgement has 
singled out the work of Prof Hugh Collins. Collins identifies three cases on relational 
contracts.97 This work identifies that relational contracts (i) lead to an implication of duties 
including of mutual trust and confidence98  - which seems to be used in the same category as 
obligations as  "good faith"99 (ii) a "long-term business relationship relies for its success on 
                                                          
95 Eric Clive and C van Mol Draft Common Frame of Reference Principles, definitions and model rules of 
European private law: Principle 22 at P.47.  
96 Acknowledging, of course, that construction contracts require the provision of a service – but that this is 
usually with the end in mind of a tangible and physical result.  
97 Hugh Collins ‘Is a Relational Contract a Legal Concept?’ in Degeling, Edelman and Goudkamp (eds), Contracts 
in Commercial Law Sydney, [New South Wales]: Thomson Reuters, 2016. 
98 Ibid at p.43  
99 Ibid at p. 57 
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the acceptance of the parties of indeterminate obligations of cooperation"100 and (iii) that a 
more contextual interpretation may arise from a relational contract.101 It is clear this echoes 
many of the features of the NEC forms (whether express or implied within that). 
In terms of the “content” of the obligations which flows from this, he says: 
"The precise content of the duties inserted by implied terms into relational contracts 
will evidently depend on the context and purpose of the transaction, the express 
undertakings made by the parties and the acknowledged implicit expectations of the 
parties. But two elements of these implicit obligations stand out: expectations of 
cooperation and loyalty in order to give business efficacy to this kind of transaction, 
and the avoidance of actions likely to destroy mutual trust and confidence between 
the parties"102 
If the focus is on the NEC suite, then that set of contracts in  structure, focus on collaboration 
and overarching good faith obligations would seem to fit that idea103 and in that context it is 
striking how clearly those ideas link with the terms and concepts set out by Collins both in 
terms of the cooperative ethos and the link in terms of "mutual trust" language.  In addition, 
in the case of the NEC suite, the structure of the contract as a whole can feed the idea of 
relationality.104 As has been suggested elsewhere, moreover, the clarity of the philosophy of 
the NEC suite makes it easier to identify the "context" against which actions can be assessed.  
As a result, since the NEC is so prescriptive in terms of its action requirements on parties to 
it, and also because it is written in plain English, it is easy to link these abstract ideas into the 
reality of carrying out the work envisaged by the contract.  
However, there remain two questions namely (i) what the transferability of these notions is 
to a different set of terms in a different construction contract and (ii) the question of how 
"good faith" might impact in those other forms of contract. These questions are linked. As 
noted above, there may be doubt about whether a construction contract is relational. That 
                                                          
100 Ibid at p.56 
101 Ibid at p. 56  
102 Ibid at p.43 
103 Capturing Collaboration and Arthur McInnis n.93  
104 Ibid   
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would pose difficulties in understanding the application of good faith or wider “relational” 
duties in construction contracts, even if the ideas around implied good faith in re Yam Seng 
were accepted. Given the variety of projects and services covered, it is unlikely that this 
question could be definitively answered.  
It would seem sensible, given the links in language and ideas– and especially given the choice 
of words in the NEC suite – that this might be seen as the parties agreeing that this contract 
was to be treated as relational – with all that that implied. An express good faith obligation – 
set up to weave through the whole contract (rather than deal with issues) - could amount to 
a contracting-in of relational ideas. At the very least it acts as evidence in favour of that.   One 
response to this might be that if parties wanted a “relational contract” then they could have 
chosen those words but – in contrast to ideas of interpretation within “commercial good 
sense” or so on – it is submitted that the idea of a relational contract per se is not one which 
is well understood outside of contract law theory. Instead, the parties have chosen to use 
terms which – in that contract law theory – are closely and inextricably linked with the idea 
of the “relational contract” such that it may be considered sufficiently synonymous as to be a 
choice to include those values.  
That, however, does not advance the overall discussion about what that actually means the 
parties actually have to do. It does mean that it must be accepted that there ought to be some 
content to the right. Jackson LJ's view about being a call to the judge has force – but the terms 
of the contract are not, in the first instance, about communicating with the judge. The focus 
is on the parties’ relationship. That provides the answer: there is a relationship rather than 
necessarily two parties operating self-interestedly.   
Overcoming self interest  
As noted above, the law has developed or is developing the idea that contracts ought to be 
more flexible and that parties are seeking to collaborate (unless there is a complex framework 
which encourages the parties to align their interests commercially) This hardening against 
good faith seen in Costain may restrict that development and it is focussed on too restrictive 
an idea of self-interest.  
Moreover, this harder approach – in the context of the NEC suite –does not take account of 
the view that the contract is aiming at flexibility and collaboration. Fundamentally, the limit 
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on expanding the scope of good faith seems to arise when there is an issue which suggests 
parties must go beyond their own self-interest in order to cooperate in mutual trust (or good 
faith). That ignores the idea of collaboration which must, if it is to have any meaning at all, 
include an idea of working together105 but it also takes too narrow a view of parties' self-
interest. That there must be some limit on the need to reach out, and that that limit may be 
difficult to define ought not to prevent any attempt to work out the definition. The idea of 
the relational contract acknowledges that parties are not just interested in themselves. As 
argued by Campbell, the fundamental nature of "good faith" is that it draws on other people 
as a reference. He says, drawing on the idea of good faith from Yam Seng,  
"As the reception to Yam Seng shows, the current situation is one in which the existing 
rules relating to good faith which are to be found in the positive law of contract cannot 
be welded into a coherent doctrine because it is thought that legitimate contractual 
self-interest is solipsistic. It is not, rather it is other regarding, as those existing rules 
indicate and as an explicit concept of good faith would make clear. The development 
of a concept of good faith would not be an altruistic imposition on the contractual law 
of agreement and the negotiations of contracting parties. It would be a clarification of 
the actual nature of the self-interest of the contracting parties which the law of 
contract must facilitate." 106 
If good faith is "other regarding" then the obligation within the NEC suit which looks at 
"mutual trust" and "cooperation" must be – even more so: they are meaningless without 
attention to another party.  
The next step is to work out what the meaning is.  
Aptly for a commonwealth-wide publication, one way to understand how this change of 
perspective from “self” to “other” regarding might arise is by looking at the view of “good 
faith” from another constituent part of the UK: Scotland.  
The Scottish Law Commission – the public body charged with reviewing the law in Scotland – 
has recently concluded a significant review of contract law, using the Draft Common Frame 
                                                          
105 that being the etymology of the work from the Latin "Cum Laborare" (to work with) 
106 David Campbell Adam Smith and the social foundation of agreement: Walford v Miles as a relational 
contract" [2017] Edin LR 376 at 404 
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of Reference as a sounding board for Scottish concepts.107 Interestingly, when it came to 
discussion of good faith, this came in terms of its use in remedies for breach, rather than in 
other areas of contract law.  The SLC stated: 
"In Scots law terms, the duty [of good faith] operates rather like a personal bar108: 
more as a shield than a sword. The emphasis otherwise would seem to be on mutual 
cooperation and disclosure with due regard for the other party's interests"109 
The discussion paper on this topic focuses on the way in which good faith is woven into the 
Scots law approach in various areas. Given that ‘in good faith’ currently is understood in 
Scotland as an intrinsic rather than express duty in the Scottish common law, the Scottish Law 
Commission considered it was not the appropriate time to try and develop the doctrine 
further.110 
Taking this forward, it may be that the adversarial nature of the construction industry and 
dispute resolution in the UK has hidden something important about the use of good faith. 
Undefined, good faith is likely to assume a subjective meaning... along the lines of "something 
someone else has done that I don’t like". This leads to it being used as a line to attack the 
position taken by one of the other parties. That may be looking at the issue from the wrong 
side of the equation.  
As highlighted by the SLC, the use of good faith as a shield rather than a sword might tell us 
something: that the true value of good faith may be in looking at how parties react to a 
breach: rather than in terms of using it as a basis for a claim by itself. On that assessment, it 
can be a defence to justify behaviour – rather than a source of outrage. It is naturally 
something which sits outside the traditional adversarial approach, which takes traditional 
contract terms as a mode of attacking the conduct of others. Instead, “good faith” as a shield 
makes parties reflect on – and justify -their own conduct. Although that seems to invert the 
idea of “other” regarding, the reflective stance it would require would naturally require 
                                                          
107  See details and outputs at the page on the Scottish Law Commission’s website for the project on Scottish 
Contract Law in the light of the Draft Common Frame of Reference: <https://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/law-
reform/law-reform-projects/contract-law-light-draft-common-frame-reference-dcf/> 
108 the English law equivalent term is "estoppel" 
109 Scottish Law Commission, Discussion Paper on Remedies for Breach of Contract, No. 163, July 2017 29 
March 2018 at para. 11.16 
110 Ibid at para. 11.22 and recommendation 75   
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consideration of the wider context.  The aim of the SLC discussion paper was to consider ways 
in which remedies for breach of contract could promote the performance of the contract – 
rather than relying on damages.111 That would seem to be one aim of collaboration.  
Adding this altogether 
In terms of how this impacts on understanding and operating the construction contract, which 
is not perhaps as "relational" as some others,  Collins, importantly,112 sketches the boundary 
between  indeterminacy and flexibility and alongside meeting parties expectations – so as to 
get to “additional obligations” which are “implicitly” recognised113  The idea of interpreting in 
"three dimensions" comes into play114 including the idea psychological contract (that parties 
behaviour to each other and understanding of what they are required to do is governed by 
assumptions and tacit understandings as much as by a document in writing: breaches of those 
understandings can, therefore, cause more difficulty than breaches of the underlying 
agreement)115.  This three-dimensional approach is more than using the wider context to 
interpret the blackletter provisions. What is relevant here, however, is the point that the 
parties ‘overall understanding of the position’ is likely to be wider than the words on the 
page… but that those dealing with the words on the page ought to take account of this wider 
understanding.  
So…what does this mean?  
Tying this back to the reality of a construction site, while this all seems relatively esoteric 
language, it recognises the simpler ideas and points to a way of understanding the contract 
in its wider context as understood by the parties’ relationship to have elements of mutual 
reinforcement. At the end of the day, the construction contract is aimed at the delivery of a 
                                                          
111 The heading on the press release publicising the Discussion Paper on Remedies for Breach of Contract  was 
headed “Honouring performance, not breach?” and says “The focus is on performing the contract as agreed, 
and as much as possible keeping the parties working together for solutions to disputes, rather than ending up 




112 Collins n.96 from pp.54ff  
113 Ibid at p.56 
114 Ibid at p.58 
115 see discussion of the link with the NEC 3 structure in Capturing Collaboration 
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project and both parties have an interest in the completion of that – even if their economic 
drivers are separate. In Amey, Jackson notes the "interest of the project"116. Without getting 
metaphysical, that can only mean the shared interests of the parties in successful delivery.  
Crucially in these construction contracts, the obligations towards relationality potentially 
supported by good faith are not to be implied but are expressly agreed by the parties in their 
contracts. The characterisation by Coulson J in Costain v Tarmac that the parties would not 
act against their self-interest fails to deal head-on with the fact that if they have agreed to 
cooperate with mutual trust they are agreeing to a wider interpretation or sense of their self-
interest. They may be taken as having agreed that this might be diluted.  In a construction 
contract, there are parameters for what "success" will look like that look at the external 
project – rather than the achievement or goals of the individual parties. The “bold” approach 
is therefore part of the requirement – but the parties need to take further steps, and the 
courts ought to encourage this. It was effective in adjudication enforcement – as a general 
rule for the start of discussions on conduct. That could be built on.  
The key issue is that the third dimension, in terms of the standard of conduct to which parties 
ought to be held, remains unclear.  
In terms then of working out how to develop the doctrine, the first step would be to recognise 
that the good faith wording has meaning and to use it to develop the psychological and three-
dimensional requirements which it entails. The parties need to embrace this. Building a 
positive culture is therefore important – and indeed fits the idea of the mood music and 
rhetorical reminder noted previously. The NEC or other similarly detailed contracts seem to 
already operate that way and the courts ought to recognise that parties have committed to 
taking steps to do this by holding them to higher standards of conduct to prevent them acting 
in a way which hinders the effective delivery of the project. If that requires, for example, 
greater transparency in discussing appropriate dispute resolution provisions (such as might 
have occurred in Costain v Tarmac,) or in providing more detail and explanation of the award 
of points in a PFI contract, (as might have happened in Medirest)then that should have been 
noted by the judges – even if it did not change the analysis. There is a reasonable chance that 
the greater transparency engendered might have helped defuse the situation. There is a 
                                                          
116 See n.72.  
   
 
 28  
 
commitment required in using the NEC and one step would be to work on the extent to which 
some of that contract’s flexibility can be achieved without the full integration of that contact’s 
overall approach. That approach could also be assisted by parties embrace of the ambiguity 
of “good faith” – and acknowledgement that it is more than a bare ‘legal’ obligation, by their 
enumerating what they think it means – and the various requirements it would bring along, 
for a particular contract.117 
That this may require a significant change of culture in the UK industry is not a flaw, or bug, 
in the system but the central point. Asking not what the contracting party or the employer is 
doing for themselves, but what they are doing for the successful delivery of the project,118 is 
a significant shift. Moreover, this requires more than simply a difference of stance but an 
acknowledgement that information must be shared and discussed – and that issues must be 
dealt with.  
This sounds perhaps over dramatic, but it comes in the context of wider calls in the industry 
for a change of attitude and practice. Such a move therefore would not occur in isolation – 
and would benefit from the wider understanding and development of standards to which 
parties could be held.  
. Professor Rudi Klein, as a response to the Carillion collapse, recently called for greater 
regulation of conduct in construction. Such a regulator would seem intrusive – but one area 
of benefit in the current discussion would be in helping to develop standards for collaboration 
and good faith. 119 That would help develop the standards which could be enforced. They may 
draw on things such as the Society for Construction Law set of construction ethics.120 At 
present, the difficulty for these sorts of documents is that they replace an open textured idea 
like “good faith” with similarly open textured ideas such as “honesty” or “fair reward”. 
However, taken together, there is scope to develop greater understanding of the commonly 
acceptable terms.  
                                                          
117 There is an interesting discussion of this idea in Richard Harvey Good Faith, Contracts and Procurement: 
Analogous Means to Achieving Legal Certainty? Society of Construction Law Paper D211, May 2018 available 
at: < https://www.scl.org.uk/papers/good-faith-contracts-procurement-analogous-means-achieving-legal-
certainty> 
118 With apologies to John F Kennedy.  
119 Rudi Klein Let's get the dogs out Building Magazine 11 April 2018 
120 Available at < https://www.scl.org.uk/resources/ethics>  
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The restrictive interpretation of good faith currently espoused would run against these 
developing trends – whereas a more constructive focus on the wider purpose of the project 
could help, more quickly, to build these trends into the legal contractual framework of 
construction projects: whether that was through acting as an aid to assessing parties conduct 
or as a route to the incorporation of particular ‘blackletter’ procedures and practices.   
There is a risk that the harder line taken in Costain v Tarmac could send the "good faith" 
obligation in construction contracts to a demise like that of the Dodo. Instead, a deeper 
understanding of the relational nature of that contract and the requirement to give a broader 
interpretation to parties' interests and the words used in the contract, could help move the 
industry closer to the Dodo’s demand that "all must win prizes" ideal, espoused by Latham.  
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